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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GEOFFREY S. RULE,
Petitioner/Appellee,
vs.
RICHELLE RULE,

Appellate Court No. 20150633-CA

Respondent/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
In Petitioner/Appellee's (hereinafter "Appellee") brief, the main argument is
that the trial court adequately considered alimony in light of the parties' "actual
~

needs". The Appel lee would have this Court think that the trial court analyzed
the parties' needs in an identical manner, but this is simply not the case.
The parties presented financial declarations at the time of trial that were
similar. The Appellee filed entered into evidence a financial declaration claiming
$5,100 per month in expenses, and represented that those expenses reflected
the standard of living established during the marriage. At the time of trial, there
were some expenses that were clearly associated with the minor child, such as
an "extra-curricular (children) UESP" entry on $83.00 and a line entry of $148,
3
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which represented a double dipping, since pretax deductions were already
factored into his net monthly income. (See Addendum B, Appellant's opening
brief).
The Appellant entered into evidence a financial declaration with the trial
court at the time of trial which stated a need, consistent with the standard of living
during the marriage, of $4,813, plus an additional $1,000 per month listed for
anticipated expenses associated with retraining in a manner consistent with the
testimony of Dr. Kristy Farnsworth. (See Addendum A, Appellant's opening brief).
In their financial declarations, the parties listed identical marital standard of
living monthly expenses for: (1) rent/mortgage, $1,296 (the Appellee was still
living in the family home); (2) real property maintenance, $200; (3) food and
household supplies, $400; (4) clothing, $75; (5) laundry & dry cleaning, $15; (6)
auto loans of at least $276.42 (the Appellee listed $400); (7) auto insurance of at
least $128.32; (8) auto gas of at least $200 (the Appellee listed $21 0); (9) auto
maintenance, $50; (10) electricity, $80; (11) gas, $175; (12) water, sewer and
garbage, $65, ( 13) telephone, $80; ( 14) paid television, $76. 70; ( 15) health
expenses of at least $200 (the Appel lee listed $208); ( 16) 401 k contribution
$596; ( 17) entertainment, $120, ( 18) donations, $50; ( 19) gifts, $80; (20)
travel/other, $300. (See Addendum A & B, Appellant's opening brief).
None of the foregoing expenses were disputed by either party as expenses
consistent with the standard of living established during the marriage. As such,
4
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the parties themselves stipulated to a standard of living, consistent with the
standard of living established during the marriage, of no less $4,463.44 per
month. In other words, there is no factual dispute by the parties that their
standard of living established during the marriage was at least $4,463.44. There
were some additional expenses that were listed differently by type of expenses or
amount between the parties' financial declarations, but a minimum amount of
$4463.44 was not disputed by the parties. The disputed amount in excess of
$4463.44 is relatively modest; only a few hundred dollars per month
~

compartmentalized to only a few expenses.
The trial court refused to make a finding of the standard of living
established during the marriage, which should have been a minimum of
$4,463.44 (per the parties' undisputed financial declarations of at least that
amount), and perhaps higher, depending on the court's determination of whether
additional expenses or differing amounts were supported by the evidence. In
refusing to make such a finding, the Appellant believes that the trial court clearly

~

erred pursuant to Dobson, where there was a remand to make more detailed
findings in light of the marital standard of living. Dobson v. Dobson, 2012 UT
App. 373, 294 P.3d 591, 597. The requirement to make such a finding is to avoid
the exact situation presented in this case; giving the Appellant a lower standard
of living based not on an equalization of standards of living due to insufficient

~

income, but rather her actual expenses at the time of trial. Such an approach is
5
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fraught with unfair and prejudicial outcomes not only for this case, but for every
divorce action in which the parties, during the post-separation/pretrial period,
could not live at the same standard of living established during the marriage.
The Appellant urges this Court to consider the impact of "marrying" people
to a time of trial standard of living when their lives have been turned upside
down, they are at their weakest point both emotionally and financially, and they
are struggling to make ends meet while seeking a long term solution for the short
term turmoil they find themselves in. Should this Court follow the trial court's
ruling, the Appellant will be forever tied to a standard of living well below the
marital standard of living regardless of the other parties' future ability to pay.
Divorce attorneys would use this case to argue that a trial court is justified in
adopting a standard of living lower than that established during the marriage
simply because there is insufficient income to meet the marital standard of living.
The Appellant believes such a position flies in the face of all of Utah appellate
case law and indeed, the stated purpose of alimony.
Instead of making a finding of the marital standard of living (the trial court
refused to do so), the trial court explicitly stated that it was going to use an actual
expense standard, as determined as of the date of trial. (R799). The factual
~

circumstances alone at the time of trial render this an abuse of discretion; the
Appellee was still in the family home, enjoying the same surroundings,
maintenance, food, utilities and retirement contributions (among other standard
6
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of living during the marriage expenses), while the Appellant was forced to move
from the home during the pendency of the case and dramatically cut her
standard of living just so that she could have a roof over her (and her child's)
~

head, food on the table and basics like electricity and a phone. The trial court
found the Appellant's expenses to be $2,702, only half of what the parties
themselves agreed was the minimum standard of living established during the
marriage ($4,463.37). By doing so, the trial court capped the Appellant's
maximum support at an amount of only about half of what the parties agreed was

0P

their minimum marital standard of living. So, should the Appellee increase his
income post-divorce, as frequently occurs in divorce cases, his responsibility to
contribute to the Appellant's need would be capped at a standard of half of what
the parties themselves agreed was the minimum established during the
marriage, regardless of his ability to pay.
On the income side, the trial court found that the Appellant could earn
minimum wage of $1,000 per month. Interestingly enough, despite Dr.

(.(:I

Farnsworth's testimony that the Appellant could not work and attend school at
the same time, the trial court still imputed minimum wage and then anticipated a
higher income would come in the future due to retraining. The Appellee's net
income was determined to be $4,810 per month.
To compound the problem, then trial court then appeared to apply
Bakanowski to this dramatically lower standard of living, giving Appellant a
7
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standard of living lower than that established during the marriage but giving the
Appellee a standard of living closer to that established during the marriage under
the guise of maximum support per Bakanowski. Bakanowski v. Bakanowski,
2003 UT App 357, 80 P .3d 153. Applying the math in this case is the best

~

means of demonstrating this unequal treatment. The parties did not dispute that
they had a marital standard of living of not less than $4463.44 per month. The
Appellant had an income of $1,000.00 per month, for a deficiency of $3463.44
per month. The Appellee had net income of $4,810.00 per month. The trial court
awarded the Appellant $1612.00 per month in alimony, leaving her with a
deficiency of $1,851.44 and the Appellee a deficiency of $1,265.44 per month,
and likely even less deficiency since the trial court applied a 22% tax rate to

~

Appellee's income (the effective tax rate after deductions such as mortgage
interest was not considered} and did not consider the alimony tax deduction he
would enjoy. In effect, the trial court gave the Appellant twice the deficiency
compared with the Appellee while capping her at a standard of living of about half
of what the parties themselves agreed was the minimum marital standard of
living. The Appellant believes that such a result is the very definition of abuse of
discretion
CONCLUSION

The Appellant believes that the trial court abused its discretion in using
actual expenses/standard of living at the time of trial instead of the marital
8
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standard of living. For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant respectfully requests
that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling on alimony and remand for
correctness and for further findings.
DATED this 6th day of July, 2016.
THE STONE LAW FIRM

Edward Stone
Attorney for the

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 6th day of July, 2016, a copy of the
foregoing was hand delivered to: Suzanne Marelius, 261 E. 300 S., Suite 300,
Salt Lake City, UT 84111.
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